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Résumé 
Même s'il a fait plus d'un million de victimes, 
rempli divers rôles tactiques et servi d'arme 
psychologique, le gaz toxique a été essentiellement 
relégué à la périphérie des analyses historiques 
de la Première Guerre mondiale. L'idée acceptée 
est qu'après l'échec de la première attaque au 
chlore, qui n'a pas créé de percée sur le front 
ouest, à la deuxième bataille d'Ypres, en avril 
1915, le gaz toxique est devenu quantité né-
gligeable. L'auteur de l'article soutient que, loin 
d'avoir disparu, la guerre chimique a gagné en 
ampleur et en intensité, grâce à la mise au 
point de vecteurs plus efficaces et de gaz plus 
meurtriers. En conséquence, la nécessité de 
fournir des dispositifs de protection a stimulé 
l'évolution d'une série de masques à gaz. 
Le gaz toxique est néanmoins resté l'arme 
psychologique puissante et perturbatrice qui 
rongeait tous les soldats du front ouest en 1918. 
Prenant comme exemple le Corps canadien, 
l'auteur étudie l'évolution du masque à gaz et 
la guerre technologique qui faisait rage sur 
le front ouest, dans l'optique de l'histoire de la 
culture matérielle. 
Abstract 
Despite causing over a million casualties, being 
employed in a variety of tactical roles, and acting 
as a psychological weapon, poison gas has 
largely been shunt to the periphery in the 
historical analysis of the First World War. 
The notion was that once the first chlorine 
attack at 2nd Ypres in April, 1915, failed to 
achieve a breakthrough on the Western Front, 
poison gas became a non-entity. This article argues 
that chemical warfare did not in fact disappear 
but continued to expand in scope and intensity 
through the introduction of more efficient delivery 
systems and deadlier gases. As a result, the need 
to provide protective devices stimulated the 
evolution of a series of gas masks. Poison gas 
remained, however, a disruptive and powerful 
psychological weapon that by 1918 plagued all 
soldiers on the Western Front. Using the 
Canadian Corps as an example, this article will 
examine the evolution of the gas mask and the 
technological struggle that raged on the Western 
Front through a material history paradigm. 
Ghoul-faced, bug-eyed soldiers emerging out 
of the haze of battle seem more like science 
fiction than a historical account of a battle. But 
such scenes were the reality of the First World 
War, a conflict where soldiers were forced not 
only to survive but to fight within the poison 
gas-drenched battlefields of the Western Front. 
In doing so, they used and adapted an increas-
ingly sophisticated array of protection devices. 
The apocalyptic wasteland of trench warfare 
was made even more intolerable by the use of 
poison gas: initially a rare occurrence, gas even-
tually became a daily event plaguing soldiers 
before, during and after battles. Despite this 
abomination of science, as many front-line 
soldiers saw it, various forms of protection were 
developed throughout the war. The evolution 
of the gas mask was a trial-by-error process 
carried out in association with the added 
measure of having to anticipate any new gases 
the enemy might develop. This see-saw struggle 
between the offensive and defensive during the 
war, and more specifically during the gas war, 
meant that a failure to quickly adapt technologies 
could result in the death or maiming of 
hundreds of thousands and the possible loss 
of the war itself. 
The gas mask provided both a functional 
and a psychological protection that has been 
ignored in the historiography of the First World 
War. Using the Canadian Corps as an example 
to analyze the effects of poison gas and 
the eventual process by which all soldiers of the 
Western Front sought to escape its ravages, 
this article will briefly examine the stages 
of the gas war, the tactical and operational 
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problems imposed by gas and the ultimate 
material solution, the gas mask. The struggle for 
new weapon systems, with the ultimate hope 
by both sides of perfecting a breakthrough 
weapon, was onset by the defensive technologies 
that were employed to cancel them and thus 
restore parity to the battlefield. 
The life of the frontsoldaten was arduous, but 
their actions were not, as is sometimes 
expressed, simply zombie-like as they moved 
through the gas to a grisly death. The soldiers 
reacted to their deadly environment by con-
tinually adapting their survival skills to cope 
with the reality of the trenches.1 Yet the gas war 
was initially seen as somehow different from 
conventional weapons, and more insidious. 
Battle skills could be employed to increase the 
chances of survival in "conventional" warfare 
in the trenches, but gas was viewed as a silent 
killer: blinding, scalding, choking and leaving 
soldiers coughing up bloody sputum until they 
expired in a horrible fashion. 
While these effects were real enough, with 
the establishment of even the crudest gas masks, 
soldiers were given a psychological as well as 
a physical protection from the ravages of gas. 
The evolution of better gas masks eventually 
prevented the probable large-scale physical 
slaughter possible from lethal chlorine and 
phosgene gas, but the fear of chemical agents 
was never wholly conquered. The introduction 
of the gas mask failed to dissipate, as it is 
wrongly assumed, the threat of gas on the 
battlefield. Although the gas mask negated 
poison gas as a breakthrough weapon, and 
ensured survival for most combatants on the 
battlefield, it never entirely protected the wearer 
from the physical, mental or moral disruptions. 
Prelude to the Gas War 
After the initial mobile stages of the war degen-
erated into the stalemate of trench warfare, 
commanders on all sides searched for methods 
and weapons to break the deadlock. The 
development and use of machine guns and 
high explosive shells had exacted a terrible toll 
on all armies in the first months of the war. As 
silent testimony to the new weapons, hundreds 
of thousands of dead were left to rot on the 
battlefield, while the survivors were forced to 
dig beneath the earth in order to escape 
the effects of the new firepower. Two thin 
strings of trenches wound their way from the 
North Sea to Switzerland; an empty field of 
battie where soldiers crouched in their ditches, 
holding their lines often less than a hundred 
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yards from their enemy. Barbed wire, fortified 
defences, machine guns and unseen artillery 
support in the rear, often annihilated attacking 
infantry in "no man's land" before they were 
even able to close with the defender. 
The balance of warfare, which had slowly 
been shifting to the defensive since the American 
Civil War in the 1860s, made a giant lurch as 
charging infantry, bayonets leveled, were cut 
down in swaths by the strengthened fortified 
defences. The need to cancel the overwhelming 
power of the defender required a series of new 
weapons.2 Airplanes, tanks and industrial 
programs to manufacture mountains of high 
explosive artillery shells all restored the power 
of the offensive; however, it took months and 
years before they were fully implemented. The 
imbalance imposed by the new trench warfare 
had to be redressed immediately, especially 
as soldiers were being massacred in the 
thousands. The reinforced defenders had either 
to be paralyzed or forced out of their positions. 
The notion of chemical warfare was not new; 
it had been used throughout history to help 
end sieges and attack an enemy out of reach of 
conventional weapons.3 In the Hague Conven-
tions of 1899 and 1907, however, the projectile 
use of gas was banned for its perceived inhumane 
and unchivalrous nature. Not only was it 
viewed as diabolical, a weapon that killed 
without warning, but it was seen as an antithesis 
to the notion of warfare as a great game.4 Yet the 
destruction wrought in the first months of 
the war — which numbered over 2.5 million 
for the Germans alone — required new methods 
to break the deadlock that was bleeding all 
armies white. With the most powerful chemical 
companies in the world, Germany began to 
prepare for the use of gas as a battlefield weapon.5 
Responding to complaints from the front 
that defenders could not be dislodged with 
conventional explosives, the Germans intro-
duced tear gas shells in the Neuve-Chapelle 
area of the Western Front on 27 October 1914. 
The tear gas failed to clear the enemy from 
their fortified trenches, and the British did not 
realize they had been the victim of a gas attack 
until they read about it after the war! The 
German agent was so impotent that the son 
of General Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief of the 
General Staff of the German Armies, was said 
to have a won a case of champagne by remaining 
in a cloud of the chemicals for five minutes 
without displaying any signs of discomfort.6 
The failure of another tear gas shell attack 
on the Eastern Front motivated Dr. Fritz Jacob 
Haber, a future Nobel-prize winning scientist 
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who would effectively run the German gas 
program, to change die focus of the German 
chemical production away from lachrymatory 
(or tear) gases and towards chlorine gas. 
Chlorine was a deadly lung irritant, easily 
compressed into liquid for transport in metal 
canisters and readily vaporized into gas when 
released. In addition, some of the brightest 
German minds were made readily available 
towards producing more effective gas and 
delivery systems.7 Haber believed that instead of 
gas shells, which could carry only a small amount 
of gas, large canisters, weighing close to one 
hundred and eighty pounds, would be filled 
with chlorine and then liberated in the face of 
a strong wind. It was unclear what the effects 
of such a weapon would produce, and thus, the 
first use of gas against enemy lines took on a 
slightly experimental atmosphere. Nonetheless, 
it was hoped that the chlorine would paralyse 
the defenders and allow the infantry to 
scramble across no man's land unhindered. 
A l though the Germans had quickly 
produced large quantities of chlorine, General 
Falkenhayn had a difficult time finding a 
commander willing to have it employed on his 
front.8 Both the generals of the 6th and 3rd 
German Armies refused to participate in the use 
of gas because of its perceived immoral nature. 
Despite the terrible slaughter already meted 
out on the Western Front, there remained a 
notion in many soldiers' minds, from general 
to private, that war was still a game to be played 
fairly. Killing a man with noxious gas certainly 
did not fall in that category. Still, some realized 
the true nature of a war that would eventually 
be labeled "total," and the Duke of Wurttemberg, 
Commander of the 4th Army, agreed to have gas 
used on his sector. Despite the prevailing winds 
of Europe blowing against the German lines 
more often than not, both Falkenhayn and 
Haber erroneously believed that the Allied 
industries were too weak to respond with an 
effective form of retaliation. 
The first gas attack was thus to be used 
against the British- and French-held Ypres 
salient in southwest Belgium. The scene 
of vicious fighting throughout the war, the Ypres 
salient was a half-moon jutting into the 
German lines with the city at the centre. 
The Allied lines were enfiladed by enemy fire 
from the surrounding high ground, but there 
was a stubborn desire by the Allies to hold the 
untenable position at all costs. It was into 
this "charnel house" that the raw, untried 1st 
Canadian Division was ordered for its baptism 
of fire and, as fate would have it, of gas and glory. 
Like the young men in Germany and 
Britain, those who joined the battalions of the 
1st Canadian Division in the heady days of 
August 1914 did so for a myriad of reasons: 
patriotism, employment, peer pressure, or a 
search for adventure. Whatever their intentions, 
few soldiers or politicians expected a war that 
would last past Christmas. Although the 
Canadians yearned to get into battle, they were 
held back in England for all of 1914 for 
additional training near Salisbury. Realizing 
that the battle was raging in Europe, the 
Canadians were overjoyed when they were 
finally given their orders to embark for France 
in February 1915. The 1st Division entered the 
Ypres lines on 14 April, with the 28th British 
Division on their right and the 45th Algerian 
(French) Division on their left. 
To the southeast of the salient (across from 
the British-held front), over six thousand gas-
filled cylinders had been placed by 10 March. 
For weeks the Germans desperately waited for 
a favourable wind, all the while hoping that the 
Allies would not discover their surprise 
weapon. A surprise weapon it was not; 
a misunderstood one it remained. The Allies 
had been alerted by spies, prisoners and intel-
ligence reports that the Germans were planning 
on using a new form of gas against their lines.9 
Yet no defensive action was undertaken, simply 
because the Allied generals had no concept of 
what would be used against them. Little if any 
information was passed down to the soldiers in 
the trenches and no preparations were made to 
defend against such an attack. 
Discuss ing the s i tua t ion wi th his 
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel 
William Hart-McHarg (who would be dead 
within days), Major Victor Odium, second-in-
command of the 7th Canadian Battalion, 
remarked that he had not "the faintest idea" of 
what gas was. "We couldn't visualize an attack 
with gas, we could not guess where the gas 
would come from or how we could recognize 
it when it did come, and we did not know 
what were the necessary precautions."10 Their 
misunderstanding of the nature of gas was 
reinforced by the French and British High Com-
mand's attempt to brush it off as either a hoax 
or an ineffective weapon that wou ld 
easily be dispersed like smoke. 
On the other side of no man's land, the 
German infantry quickly became exasperated 
with a weapon that not only relied on the wind 
to work, but was also susceptible to British 
shells that periodically burst open canisters, 
spewing their deadly contents throughout the 
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Fig.l 
The Second Battle of 
Ypres, 1915, by Richard 
Jack, 35.5 cm x 56.5 cm 
(National Archives of 
Canada C-014145) 
German front lines.11 Accordingly, many of the 
gas canisters were moved north, across from 
the French divisions, where the wind was more 
accommodating. The planned German attack 
was limited to the capture of Pilckem Ridge, one 
of the few high points still in Allied hands 
and one which the Germans had fought for 
months to capture.12 
The Birth of a New Warfare 
After a furious artillery bombardment during the 
early part of 22 April 1915, all activity stopped 
from me German lines and an ominous quiet fell 
on the battlefield. Then, shortly before four 
o'clock in the afternoon, the German artillery 
began to shell die Allied lines rear area and the 
town of Ypres. As the Allied soldiers kept their 
heads down, the German gas units, derisively 
known as Stinkpioneres by their own infantry, 
released 160 tons of chlorine from 5 730 can-
isters.13 A green-yellow cloud, 10 kilometres 
wide and a kilometre deep, blotted out die sun 
and quickly passed through the 45th Algerian and 
87di French Territorial Divisions. The French 
troops fled in terror, clutching their necks and 
screaming "asphyxiate, asphyxiate," as the gas 
seeped into the crevices and trenches where 
they were taking cover. Major Andrew 
McNaughton, an artillery officer who would 
later command the Canadian Army in the 
Second World War, remembered the Algerians 
streaming past him, "their eyeballs showing 
white, and coughing tiieir lungs out — diey 
literally were coughing dieir lungs out; glue 
was coming out of their mouths. It was a 
very disturbing, very disturbing sight."14 Two 
divisions almost evaporated, leaving litde except 
diousands of dead and dying French in the 
German path. To the shinned Canadians watch-
ing diis horrible spectacle on die right, they 
had only minutes before the outer edges of the 
cloud enveloped die outer edge of dieir lines. 
Through tearing eyes and hacking coughs, it 
is no wonder that the Canadians viewed the poor 
French witii apprehension. With lungs ripped 
raw by chlorine, men turned blue and then 
green-black, their eyes bulging as they sought air. 
Behind tins horror the German troops cautiously 
advanced, over die dead vegetation, animal life 
and French soldiers. A 1.5 kilometre-long gap 
had been opened in the Allied line from die 
experimental weapon and die 1st Canadian 
Division shifted over, along witii isolated French 
outposts, to fill it and block the expected 
German breakthrough. Buying time for 
reinforcements to be rushed in, the Canadians 
fought a series of vicious sacrificial battles. 
On the morning of April 24 die battered 
Canadians were once again pounded by the 
German artillery and this time it was accom-
panied by the hissing of gas — the second 
chlorine gas attack of the war was directly 
against the Canadian lines. As die wall of gas 
drifted toward dieir trenches, officers and men, 
noticing the green tarnish to their buttons two 
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days before, had realized that the Germans were 
using chlorine against them. Not yet equipped 
with any sort of protection, men were ordered 
to rip off pieces of cloth, urinate on them and 
hold them to their faces. With "invisible death 
creeping up" on them, as one Canadian later 
described it, those soldiers that followed the 
instructions were generally saved as the urine 
partly neutralized and then crystallized the 
chlorine.15 Those that did not, or could not, 
suffered a terrible fate. 
The German infantry once again advanced 
behind their lethal cloud, but this time expected 
a routed force and only empty lines to pass 
through. Instead, they met a fusillade of bullets 
from Canadian Ross rifles as half-choked and 
blinded men fired through the still lingering 
haze of the cloud. The Germans were cut to 
pieces, but their overwhelming numbers and 
artillery inevitably pushed the Canadians back. 
Still, the resilient defence proved that gas was 
not the war-winning weapon that many called 
it immediately after the gruesome results of the 
first batde were publicized. Although it may not 
have harkened the end of the war, its effects 
were still potent. When the Canadians were 
pulled out of the line the next day, they had lost 
almost half their fighting strength, close to six 
thousand men in three days of fighting. Thou-
sands had been lost in the immediate aftermath 
of the gas or to its secondary effects, which 
caused confused, helpless men to be captured, 
or to be rendered unconscious and then killed 
by conventional weapons. 
Gas had proved devastating, both physically 
and psychologically. Before the stalemate of 
the Western Front had set in, many victorious 
battles over the centuries had often been 
decided by which side first gave in and 
retreated. Most deaths occurred when an army 
was in retreat and the sight of one's allies flee-
ing the battlefield could reduce a once-strong 
army to a rabble also looking to escape from the 
front.16 Not only did gas endanger soldiers 
directly with inescapable horror, but also 
psychologically as it undercut morale from the 
bottom up. 
Immediately following the German use of 
gas, the Allies seized upon this event as an 
effective form of propaganda. Not only did 
politicians, soldiers and newspapers rage about 
the new depths to which the barbarous Hun had 
sunk, but there was also a genuine revulsion 
against gas among the Allies — and among 
many Germans as well. It simply did not fall 
within the accepted confines of how war was 
viewed or portrayed; soldiers died valiantly 
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defending their country's honour, fighting to 
the last, not suffocated ignominiously by some 
unseen gas, which was controlled and 
unleashed not by soldiers but by chemists. Lord 
Kitchener, British war hero and Secretary of 
State for War, was aghast when he heard the 
news and thought it "wicked and barbarous," 
while more junior officers condemned this 
"dirty gas stuff" and accused the Germans of 
being "not [willing] to face us in a fair fight."17 
The Germans were eventually reduced to 
pleading that their gas actions were retaliatory 
responses to the first use by the French (a 
primitive tear gas grenade that was all but 
useless), and that their own gas attacks were not 
projectile-based and simply a weapon carried 
by the wind, and therefore within the confines 
of the Hague Convention.18 Although this was 
true, they had broken the spirit of the Convention 
and were roundly condemned throughout the 
world.19 Gas thus became an effective tool of 
Allied propaganda, especially with the attempt 
to bring the United States into the war (at least 
until the Allies responded with like force 
in September 1915), but , despi te the 
propaganda victory, there still remained 
the major task of protecting the soldiers against 
further chemical attacks. 
Dubious Protection: The Early Gas 
Masks 
The advent of poison gas threatened to achieve 
a breakthrough on the Western Front. The 
notion that the Germans could continue to 
employ gas against the Allies at will was a 
frightening one. With little idea of how to 
counter the threat, Kitchener, after being advised 
by his army commanders that soldiers in the 
trenches had used "wetted" cloths to protect 
themselves, beseeched the women of Britain to 
reproduce replicas of German cloth masks. 
Within the first thirty-six hours, 30 000 cotton 
pad masks were produced.20 But before the gas 
pads were issued to British troops on May 3, the 
British were gassed two more times, once on 
April 26 and a second time on May 2. The gas 
caused thousands of casualties but failed to 
exterminate the tenacious British troops. 
Nonetheless, the effect of the chlorine cloud was 
tremendous; British Brigadier-General F. 
Gore-Anley of the 12th Infantry Brigade noted 
that the gas attack on May 2 "was absolutely 
overpowering, the officers and men seemed to 
lose their senses, most of them getting out of the 
trenches and reeling about under enemy's rifle 
fire ..."21 Although the British held their 
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trenches, further effects of gas, besides its direct 
casualty impact, soon became apparent. Gas 
produced profound confusion, misdirection 
and disorder among those in its path: soldiers 
rushed about in terror, looking for cover or help, 
officers shouted orders, which were muffled by 
rags over and in their mouths, visibility was 
reduced, communications cut off, and the whole 
atmosphere was filled with fear and appre-
hension. Rarely has nineteenth-century Prussian 
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz's notion 
of "friction" — all of the unexpected factors in 
war that cause constant action and reaction to 
changing situations — been better illustrated 
than amongst the chaos of trying to defend a 
trench in the face of a gas cloud. 
To help protect against this intangible terror 
and the friction it caused, troops were issued 
with the cotton gas protectors. These were 
stored in boxes to the rear of the trench and 
issued to the soldiers who had been quickly 
instructed to wet them in buckets of chemical 
solution, and fold the pad of cotton over the 
mouth and nose during a gas attack. Unfortu-
nately, there was nothing to hold it in place, so 
the men had to stuff the chemically-dipped 
rags in their mouths. As one soldier quipped, 
"These practices were popular for once or twice, 
but when it began to be realised that the wads 
were not always used by the same man the 
novelty waned."22. The cotton wool pad was 
almost useless as protection, for it dried out too 
quickly, or more commonly, became a soaked 
mess when overly saturated with a chemical 
solution by terrified soldiers who had no faith 
that these pads might really work, or confi-
dence that the scant training they received 
would be relevant.23 On this very point British 
officer/poet Robert Graves characterized his 
first gassing in May of 1915: 
A soldier came rushing in, his eyes blank with 
horror and excitement. "Gas, sir, gas! They're 
using gas!"...Gas had become a nightmare. 
Nobody believed in the efficacy of our respi-
rators, though advertised as proof against any 
gas the enemy could send over. Pink army 
forms marked "Urgent" constantly arrived 
from headquarters to explain how to use these 
accessories: all contradictory.24 
In attempting to explain the high British gas 
casualties, one after-battle report issued by 
Lieutenant-General C. F. H. Macready, 
Adjutant-General of the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF), noted that "very few of them 
[soldiers] had been properly trained in the use 
of respirators."25 Officers with no training in 
anti-gas matters were simply told to hand out 
the masks to the men. There was little under-
standing about creating a doctrine — the 
method by which soldiers were taught — and 
the overall effect was haphazard and unco-
ordinated. Cases were reported of soldiers 
putting masks over their mouths and leaving 
their noses exposed to the poisoned air while 
others were said to be indignant when 
reproached for not protecting themselves, and 
opened their coats to show the cotton masks tied 
around the chest.26 That might sound absurd, 
but one must remember that most men had 
never seen or even imagined what gas could do 
or how it affected a person. Without proper gas 
teaming, the common soldier generally had little 
idea about how to defend against a gas attack.27 
Within a week of the first British units being 
issued their new gas masks, the 1st Canadian 
Division was issued with the cotton mask, but 
only after a harsh 26-kilometee march to Bailleul 
during which several Canadians died from the 
lingering effects of gas.28 Along with the mask 
came the first in a long series of instructions 
from High Command; the Routine Orders 
informed that "experience shows that the effect 
[of gas] can be successfully combated if certain 
simple methods are carefully carried out."29 
What these methods were and how they were 
to be taught to the "poor bloody infantry" was 
less certain. 
Surviving in a gas cloud was a near thing; 
fighting while wearing a mask was almost 
impossible. The early masks were only partly 
adequate in protecting against chlorine, and 
utterly ineffective for lachrymatory or "weeping" 
gases, as well as remaining fearful things to 
keep attached over the nose and throat. Issued 
on May 20, the Black Veil respirator had a 
pouch for the pad to sit in and a string to hold 
the mask in place, and was thus an improvement 
to the hand-held cloth. Still, its fragile 
construction virtually immobilized a man for 
risk of losing his mask — not the most ideal 
conditions for frantic soldiers trying to defend 
their trenches.30 
Following the German gas attack on 24 May, 
there was not another canister gas attack on 
the Western Front until December, 1915. The 
prevailing winds were blowing against 
the Germans and they quickly adapted by trans-
porting their gas pioneers to the Eastern Front. 
Although the Allies were given a natural period 
of grace, the hapless Russians, many of whom 
had not been issued any form of gas mask, were 
killed in the thousands. As the Russians 
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were being gassed to death, the Canadians strug-
gled with their Black Veil respirators. One Staff 
Officer report indicated that it was "good against 
chlorine," but "only gave good protection in the 
hands of an expert who had plenty of practice."31 
Such experts the Canadians were not. One of 
the reasons why the Hypo Helmet, a chemically 
treated bag that fit over the head, was 
introduced in the summer of 1915 was its 
simplicity in comparison to the Black Veil mask. 
The idea for a gas mask in the form of a 
helmet originated from a Canadian sergeant 
who was gassed at Ypres and had seen some of 
the German gas pioneers wearing what looked 
like flour bags over their heads. A Newfoundland 
medical officer, Captain Cluny Macpherson, 
experimented with the idea and eventually 
developed the Hypo Helmet. Some 2.5 million 
were issued during the war and by 6 July 1915 
every soldier in the BEF was equipped with one.32 
Looking like a flour bag, the Hypo or Smoke 
Helmet was chemically treated, worn over the 
head and tucked in at the neck. The poison 
gas was neutralised by the chemicals of 
the helmet as the man breathed through the 
fabric. Yet not only did the Hypo smell, as one 
Canadian soldier lamented, "like last year's 
bird seed," but it was also cumbersome, 
stifling and blinding.33 Because the helmet was 
impregnated with a chemical solution, the 
unfortunate effect for soldiers, especially when 
they sweated, which occurred constantly, was 
that the forehead was burned and the eyes stung 
from the chemical irritants.34 Canadian infantry-
man Owen Bingham of the 78th Battalion 
remembered how the helmet would give "you 
burns right across the neck and on your fore-
head."35 In addition to the nagging pain while 
wearing the helmet, the mica window through 
which the soldier was to look clouded up 
almost immediately, and worse, tended to crack 
and shatter with the slightest disturbance. 
Even after the mica window was replaced by a 
plastic substitute, there remained the disturbing 
fact that the chemically impregnated helmets 
lost their ability to filter gas when exposed to 
air for long periods of time. The Canadian Corps 
headquarters' response to worried front-line 
reports about the fragile helmets was to order 
soldiers to keep their gas helmets clean and 
away from water.36 This did little to instill faith 
in the gas helmet, given the muddy, rain-soaked 
environment of the Western Front. 
The alien nature of the gas helmets initially 
seemed bizarre for soldiers. Lieutenant 
D. E. Macintyre remarked in his diary how he 
made his men "practice breathing with our gas 
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helmets on and the men surely do look a weird 
sight when they are wearing them. Great 
goggle-eyed things like a false face."37 The 
simple inability to communicate and the hearing 
of one's intake of breath rushing in and out left 
men feeling isolated from their comrades. Still, 
it offered some protection, but only if used cor-
rectly. One British officer of the 2nd Royal 
Welch Fusiliers, caught taking a bath during a 
gas attack alarm, simply "pulled on his gas 
helmet and stood waiting for the 'all clear,'" 
forgetting that he was defenceless because he 
had no garment into which to tuck the free end 
of the helmet!38 The addled officer was saved 
by his quick-moving batman, who rushed him 
some clothing, but such stories highlighted the 
importance of not just handing out gas 
helmets, but actually teaching soldiers to use 
them correctly during gas attacks. 
Further instructions were accordingly 
supplied, and in the summer heat of June 1915, 
the Canadian Corps ordered that all men had 
to wear their great coats during gas alerts in 
order to have something into which to tuck 
their helmets.39 Because the chemicals in the 
helmet gave little protection against the various 
tear gases as opposed to chlorine gas, goggles 
were issued in June 1915 to be worn underneath 
the gas helmets. The use of goggles eventually 
developed into a problem for implementing a 
good anti-gas defence when it was realized that 
soldiers tended to keep their hated gas masks 
in their containers and instead wore only their 
more comfortable goggles when tear gas was 
used. This resulted in dozens of casualties in 
mid-1917, when the Germans introduced a gas 
that was both lethal and lachrymatory in nature. 
The Canadian Gas Services recalled all goggles 
in June 1917 and the British followed suit three 
months later.40 Despite the goggle fiasco, the 
Hypo Helmet was effective against mild con-
centrations of chlorine, although it was opposed 
by physiologists in England, of course without 
front-line soldiers knowing, on the grounds 
that the excess buildup of carbon dioxide within 
the helmet would eventually cause the wearer 
to lose consciousness, and perhaps even die.41 
British scientists continued to struggle against 
the spectre of German gas. Their greatest fear 
was whether the Germans would introduce 
a new chemical agent that could not be absorbed 
by the gas helmets. As the epitome of the 
new scientific warfare, poison gas caught 
the attention of many. One such man was 
Charles Aiken of McGill University in Montreal, 
who, upon hearing of the patriotic response of 
Britain's women, embarked on his own attempt 
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to save the boys at the front. Forwarded to 
Sam Hughes, Canada's Minister of Militia, 
Aiken's mask was unique in appearance: a long 
metal pole with perforations at the bottom end 
of the tube and topped with a rubber mask 
which covered the mouth, nose and eyes. The 
metal tube was driven into the ground and 
the natural oxygen from the soil gave adequate 
protection against lethal gases, as Aiken proved 
when he used the mask in a tent full of gases 
on the university grounds on 2 June 1915. 
Delighted with the idea of another Canadian 
contribution to the war, Hughes forwarded 
the drawings and report to Lord Kitchener 
and the War Office later that month. Theoretically 
the apparatus worked, except in mud — a 
justifiable concern for soldiers in the trenches 
of Flanders — but it also fixed the wearer to 
his gas mask, which was stuck in the ground. 
The idea of soldiers defending their trenches 
like tethered horses while they waited, 
immobilized, for the German infantry to come 
over the top did not even warrant a response 
from the War Office.42 
Along with the impetus for new gas masks, 
there was also a need for a structure from which 
an established doctrine could be disseminated. 
Transferred from the office of the Director 
General of Medical Services, the British Gas 
Services were formally established as a distinct 
entity under Major-General H. F. Thuillier in 
January 1916.43 Under such a central authority, 
the British hoped to craft and refine both the 
offensive and defensive aspects of gas warfare, 
in which Canada would share as part of the 
larger BEF structure. Although an organization 
was in place, there was no effective means for 
working with lower command units and 
especially for actively training the soldier at 
the front in good gas discipline. 
As the British worked to revise its gas 
organizations, the Germans continued to 
improve their gas tactics on the Eastern Front. 
In the process they realized the most serious 
failure of gas as a weapon: the inability to direct 
it accurately to a desired spot. A new delivery 
system was needed, but before the Germans 
perfected that, they introduced a more lethal 
gas. Eight times more deadly than chlorine, 
phosgene was almost invisible and without 
smell. It was a significant advance in making 
the gas war a major issue for the Allies. The 
rumours of its use on the Eastern Front 
provoked the Adjutant General of the BEF to 
write to the Secretary of State for War: "I desire 
to call your attention to the very grave situation 
that may arise if the enemy succeeds in using 
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this gas before we are provided with some 
means of neutralising it."44 British scientists 
scrambled to develop a more protective mask 
as they waited for this new deadly gas. Once 
again, the scale of technology tipped back in 
favour of the offensive. Despite the introduction 
of more effective gas masks, the front-line 
soldier had little knowledge of how to employ 
them effectively. 
The Russians were the first to be ravaged by 
phosgene . As their t roops were being 
decimated, their leaders warned the British that 
the Germans had indeed unleashed a new gas. 
Deducing that this was the phosgene, the British 
added the chemical solution of sodium 
phenate to the new P Helmet in order to 
protect against it.45 Interestingly, the P did not 
stand for phosgene, but rather, phenate, and it 
was issued to British and Canadian soldiers in 
November 1915. 
The helmet, with its shapeless hood, two 
eyeholes and a rubber tube hanging down from 
the mouth, had a bizarre appearance and the 
snout-like apparatus quickly became known to 
the trench soldiers as "the goggle-eyed booger 
with the tit."46 A significant improvement on 
previous gas helmets was the "tit," a special 
valve that removed the built-up carbon dioxide 
in the helmet. Unfortunately, it was extremely 
awkward, cutting comers of the mouth and 
causing soldiers to drool down their chins; it 
was not uncommon for soldiers to have their 
shirts slick with saliva after wearing the helmet 
for any period of time. In all but the highest con-
centrations of chlorine (less so for phosgene), 
the mask would protect the wearer but it 
remained a terrible burden to wear and one 
Canadian described it as such: 
Most everyone was loath to put on the mask 
because it was so uncomfortable. The sack 
kind of material that the mask was made out 
of had been treated chemically and had a 
pincher type clamp that clamped over the 
nose with an elongated mouth piece that 
fitted in the mouth.47 
Although protecting the wearer from having 
his lungs burned out, the P Helmet left anyone 
wearing it stifled, cloistered and exhausted. 
A "Secret" memo by Canadian Headquarters 
was more frank, reporting that "These men 
must be warned that they may expect to 
experience not only slight discomfort but very 
serious discomfort in some cases almost 
amounting to a feeling of suffocation." The 
solution, as espoused by the High Command, 
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was to "avoid movement."4 8 As rumours of 
new German gases spread through the Allied 
armies, the front-line soldier needed more 
efficient protection rather than cryptic letters 
from the rear. 
Equally detrimental, the user became effec-
tively blind when the helmet was pulled over 
the head. Gas attacks, like artillery barrages, 
were often the precursor to large-scale infantry 
attacks or raids, but when the gas was released, 
soldiers could barely see five feet in front of 
them through their murky eyepieces.49 The 
anxiety of peering over trench parapets, hoping 
to c a t c h g l i m p s e s of s h a d o w y f i gu re s 
advancing, left defenders both terrified of gas 
and of the subsequent friction imposed by it on 
the battlefield. 
Not only was there fear of what was lurking 
behind the cloud, but also of whether one's gas 
mask would function properly. There was no 
method of realistically testing them to full 
battle conditions and thus soldiers were left to 
wait fatalistically, isolated and frightful, as the 
poison death moved towards them: 
As I lay there I wondered if my gas mask would 
protect me. The only tests my mask had was 
in a building [where] the volume and density of 
the gas had been controlled. From the colour 
of this poison gas cloud bearing down on us 
it looked like it was a very strong mixture....All 
these thoughts raced through my mind as I lay 
there waiting for the gas to pass over us. Would 
my mask prove to be good or would I die a 
most horrible death. There was nothing to be 
done but wait and see. So I took to praying.50 
Cases of soldiers suffocating with their masks 
on in high concentrations of gas were uncommon, 
but their occasional occurrence only added 
strength to the rumour-mill associated with gas. 
When the winds were again blowing advan-
tageously, the Germans released their new gas 
against the British at Ypres. On 19 December 
1915, a combination of phosgene and chlorine 
swept over the British lines, inflicting over a 
thousand casualties. Although some men were 
reported to have died with their helmets on in 
the densest concentrations of the gas, most 
casualties were from men taking their helmets 
off too soon, not donning them quickly enough 
or panicking and r ipping off their helmets 
during the attack because they smelled gas. 
Once again, the issue of gas masks was not 
enough; soldiers had to be trained in their use. 
With the winds once again blowing against 
the Germans, they did not release another gas 
cloud attack for months. During this interval, the 
British issued the PH Helmets (the same design 
as the P Helmet) during the lapse, with its 
added protection of the chemical hexamine, in 
order to better absorb phosgene. The Germans 
responded by increasing the density of their 
phosgene gas clouds by adding more canisters 
in a smaller area and the soldiers suffered 
accordingly. The Canadian Corps began to 
receive their new helmets (each man received 
two) on 4 February 1916, but the only chemical 
agents they had encountered for months had 
been tear gas shells.5 1 After the disastrous 
Battle of St Eloi from April 4 to 19, where the 
2nd Division suffered almost 1 500 casualties 
in a confusing action where the location of the 
C a n a d i a n a n d G e r m a n front l i n e s w e r e 
unknown, the Corps fell victim to a surprise gas 
attack on the night of April 27.M 
With the squealing and rush of whirling 
bodies, thousands of rats scurried over to the 
Canadian lines, leaping into the frightened 
soldier's faces and laps, as they instinctively fled 
from the po i son fol lowing them. A light 
chlorine gas cloud moved through the Canadian 
lines but the men were able to withstand it, 
having been roused by gas alarms, bells and 
sirens, the rats and shouts of fear. Beating back 
a small raiding party of Germans even though 
they could barely see through their clouded-
over plastic eyepieces, the stark terror of a gas 
attack and the incredible adrenaline rush left the 
Canadian defenders drained as they slumped to 
Fig. 2 
Canadian soldier 
wearing PH Helmet, 
Shorncliffe, Kent, 1917 
(National Archives of 
Canada PA-056171) 
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Fig. 3 
Alternate method of 
wearing anti-gas helmets 
during gas alert (RG9, 
series Ul-C-3, vol. 4039, 
folder 10, file 15) 
the ground, smoking cigarettes or sleeping 
from the combined effects of gas and fighting.53 
Within minutes the Germans released a "second 
gas cloud, which was very thick" and caught 
many Canadians who had "thrown their 
helmets away" when they had "thought all was 
over."54 Some soldiers were gassed due to slow-
ness in getting their gas helmets out of the 
pouches inside their great coats and others were 
killed because they no longer had their helmets 
with them. As well, because the Germans had 
increased the concentration of the cloud attack, 
some wearers of the PH Helmet could only take 
in oxygen if they stayed absolutely still and 
did not make heavy exertions.55 
Due to the wind patterns, the gas was most 
effective against the British units to the north 
of the Canadians. The British suffered 1 260 
casualties, of whom 338 died.56 The total Cana-
dian gas casualties were unclear, but among 
them were twenty cases of gassed new recruits 
who had only joined their unit three days 
earlier.57 The gas war, like all other aspects of 
the Great War, required time to learn how to 
survive. As one artillery officer remarked, 
"Green troops always hated gas. Our first gas 
alerts were the worst."58 One sergeant-major 
was so afraid of gas that "on his first trip into 
the line [he] slept all night in his gas mask."59 
Having a gas helmet generally provided good 
protection, but knowing when to put it on, how 
to identify gases and drilling the anti-gas doctrine 
into soldiers proved that it required more than 
a quartermaster handing over a gas mask 
and muttering "best of luck chum," in order to 
survive on the chemical battlefield. 
Following the chaos of the April gas attack, 
the First Army ordered the Canadian Corps on 
23 May 1916 to appoint a divisional gas officer, 
the catalyst in the creation of the Canadian Gas 
Services.60 The eventual organization consisted 
of junior gas officers and non-commissioned 
officers at the brigade, battalion, and company 
level, with a Chemical Corps Advisor finally 
added in March 1917. Throughout the war they 
prodded and railed against the lack of aware-
ness regarding gas and continually demanded 
more frequent and realistic training. Although 
beyond the scope of this article, the Gas Services 
played an important role in ensuring that 
the Canadian Corps would not be ravaged 
by the spiralling gas war, gas masks or not. The 
development of new technological protective 
devices was greatly complemented by an 
effective system of instruction. The Gas Services' 
constant diligence provided Canadian soldiers 
with the skill and knowledge of not only donning 
their gas respirators quickly, but of learning 
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when it was safe to remove them, how to 
identify different variations of gas, and most 
importantly, how to survive and successfully 
carry out their operations in the future gas 
environment of the Western Front.61 
New Delivery Systems and the Small 
Box Respirator 
The chance of encountering gas rose dramatically 
with the introduction of the lethal gas shell. 
Before, it had taken weeks to bring gas canisters 
into the line, set them up under the constant fear 
of enemy shells puncturing the metal containers, 
and then finally, waiting for a proper wind to 
release the cloud from hundreds of these 
embedded canisters toward enemy lines. The 
lack of control over the gas, and the subservient 
role that the infantry played to a weapon that 
forced them to cancel operations and plans 
because of the weather, left a bad taste in many 
commanders' mouths. During the bloodbath at 
Verdun that raged for almost all of 1916, and 
where almost seven hundred thousand Germans 
and French would eventually be killed, lethal 
gas shells were first used to deadly effect. 
Instead of having to be alert when the wind 
was blowing in the right direction or looking out 
for unusual activity in the opposite trenches, at 
any time artillery or mortar gunners could now 
drop gas shells in and around one's trenches. 
With gas shells making a deceptively soft 'plop' 
and easily lost within conventional (and deaf-
eningly loud) high explosive bombardments, 
soldiers had to be constantly alert to the 
presence of gas. This was made more difficult 
by phosgene's lack of smell, night attacks, and 
the general confusion of attempting to warn 
large numbers of men quickly. In addition, 
those men and horses bringing up supplies 
along the lines of communication leading to and 
away from the front and the artillery in the rear 
were susceptible to isolated gas shells falling 
unseen between the alarms of the front. Soldiers 
could not wear the PH Helmets all the time, and 
equally important, the PH Helmet could not be 
impregnated with any more chemicals unless 
the solutions that protected against chlorine 
were to be weakened. If the Germans intro-
duced new gases or higher concentrations of 
old, it could spell disaster for the Allies.62 
To help relieve pressure on the French, 
General Sir Douglas Haig, Commander of British 
Expeditionary Force, launched the Battle of the 
Somme in the summer of 1916. The anticipated 
breakthrough was smashed when the artillery 
failed to destroy the German fixed defences; the 
initial result was the most disastrous day in 
British military history — 1 July 1916 — with 
close to 20 000 dead and another 40 000 as 
casualties. The Somme was a killing ground on a 
par with Verdun, and, like there, both sides 
used gas frequently, in canister and shell. Instead 
of gas being employed perhaps once a month, 
it was now being used weekly and sometimes 
daily. When the Canadians arrived at the Somme 
front in early September, they were warned 
that "the enemy now has a very large supply of 
[lethal gas] shells and uses them extensively 
against our positions."63 The recorded Canadian 
gas casualties on the Somme were almost 
non-existent — around 180 — largely due to the 
failure of the German artillery to concentrate 
their gas shell shoots. This would change in 
the coming months; however, the untold 
friction and high gas casualty rate among NCOs 
and officers on the Somme left officials worried.64 
The questionable protection of the PH Helmet 
in negating the effects of gas was very much 
reduced by rushing back and forth. Yet this is 
exactly what officers and NCOs were forced to 
do in battle. The friction imposed by the gas — 
weeping eyes, muffled voices behind gas 
helmets, the need to order or forcefully help 
confused or stunned soldiers get their masks on 
— left those in command, and the most important 
men in the units, more susceptible to becoming 
exhausted and gassed. Equally detrimental was 
the difficult job of ascertaining if gas had suffi-
ciently cleared from the trenches. The common 
practice was to raise the mask slightly and sniff 
the air. But the chemical smell of the helmet 
mixed with the gas fumes arising from clothes 
left officers with deadened olfactory senses. 
Realizing the need to get the hated and debilitating 
gas helmets off as quickly as possible, officers 
generally removed their helmets completely 
and were occasionally gassed in the process.65 
These remained problems throughout the war 
and were never fully solved, even with the 
introduction of better gas masks and training. 
Following the PH Helmet, two gas masks 
briefly made their appearance on the batdefield. 
Shortly after the distribution of the PH Helmet, 
a rubberized goggle was added to create the PHG 
Helmet. More difficult to handle than the 
regular PH Helmet, it was quickly discarded. 
Experimentation to develop a better mask 
continued and a newly conceptualised model 
was introduced. The Large Box Respirator (LBR) 
— Tarbox Respirator or Harrison's Tower, as 
the soldiers nicknamed it — was a radical 
departure from the gas helmets. It worked on the 
principle of air passing through a canister of 
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Fig. 4 
Two soldiers with Small 
Box Respirators examine 
a Lee Enfield rifle, March 
1917. (National Archives 
of Canada PA-001027) 
chemicals to strain the impurities. The LBR was 
reserved for specialist troops like machine 
gunners and artillery observers, but it too 
was unwieldy and was discontinued in the 
summer of 1916.66 The concept was sound, 
however, and a group of scientists, headed by 
Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Harrison, continued to 
refine their respirator mask.67 
The best gas mask of the war, the Small Box 
Respirator (SBR), was issued by the British in 
August 1916, and was used until the end of the 
war. Soldiers and gas officers at the front had 
worked in conjunction with the scientists in the 
Medical Branch of the War Office to develop a 
mask that would offer more efficient protection 
in the growing gas environment of the Western 
Front. Lighter, at 1.5 kilograms, more comfortable 
and better able to withstand higher concentrations 
of gas than the previous gas helmets, the SBR 
was almost entirely effective in protecting the 
wearer's lungs from gas.68 Carried in a satchel 
on the chest, charcoal and chemical granules 
packed in a metal container filtered out the 
poison gas. From the container a rubber tube led 
to the mask which covered the mouth and nose. 
As air entered the valve in the bottom of the 
satchel, it passed through the chemicals and 
was taken in through a metal mouthpiece. To 
ensure the wearer did not breathe through his 
nose, a nose clip was worn clothes-peg fashion. 
Although the device was effective, it was 
an unnatural method through which to breathe 
during any period of heavy activity. There were 
six different sizes of SBRs and each man was 
fitted with one that offered the most air-tight 
protection. Unfortunately, any time in the front 
trenches left men gaunt from lack of sleep, 
poor food and the stress of being shot at and 
bombed around the clock. The resulting 
dilapidated state of the men caused their gas 
masks to lose air-tightness and required 
Gas Services officers to constantly check the 
men under their command.69 But as the War 
Diary of the 3rd Battalion, Special Brigade 
remarked after a gas attack on 21 August 1916, 
"there were practically no cases of slight poison-
ing. If men put their masks on quickly enough 
and in the right way they were unharmed. If a 
mistake was made it cost a man his life."70 
British units were issued with the SBR 
between August and December, and the Cana-
dian Corps began to receive their SBRs in late 
November.71 W. J. O'Brien of the 1st Battery, 
1st Brigade, Canadian Field Artillery did not 
receive his SBR, which he described "as a 
dandy," until 11 December 1916.72 While the 
SBR was the first line of defence, PH Helmets 
were still to be kept in case of damage to the 
respirator.73 The contrast between the two 
masks was made clear by soldiers' actions. The 
Quartermaster General of the British Expedi-
tionary Force complained strongly that soldiers 
were losing their PH Helmets. Many men did 
not want the added burden of two gas masks, 
and especially during large battles they were 
inclined to drop whatever was not essential. 
The report condemned all ranks of the BEF for 
losing some nine million PH Helmets, although 
it acknowledged that almost no SBRs were lost.74 
Such actions shed light on the mentality of 
the Canadian and British soldiers who, although 
believing in the importance of the gas mask, 
were not fully convinced that they would need 
double the protection. Combined with the 
natural tendency to remove all unimportant 
equipment, this attitude resulted in the 
perceived non-essentials (the PH Helmet) being 
dropped in some hole in the ground during an 
advance. Unfortunately, in a separate study of 
1 082 SBRs, 25 percent were found to be damaged 
and would have given no or partial protection.75 
In addition, there were a surprisingly high 
number of cases like J. I. Chambers of the 7th 
Battalion, who, after surviving a vicious artillery 
barrage, realized with horror that both of his gas 
masks had been punctured!76 Thus, it was 
important to have two gas masks at all times, a 
lesson only absorbed after vigorous lectures or 
seeing a companion suffocating to death as he 
fumbled with a faulty respirator. Most soldiers 
took their chances, while few took the warnings 
to heart. 
Like all soldiers of the BEF, once the Cana-
dians began to train with the SBR, they realized 
its advantage over the previous gas helmets. 
The soldiers were drilled to quickly don their 
masks and had to be able to accomplish it in 
under six seconds. Although the SBR could be 
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adjusted in about half the time of the PH Helmet, 
it was still a difficult process, as George Maxwell 
of the 49th Battalion described: 
Every man hustled to get his mask adjusted. 
To do this, the steel helmet had to be jerked off; 
the mask had to be pulled over the head; the 
chimp had to be fastened on the nose to shut 
off the breathing with that organ, forcing one 
to breathe by mouth through the chemically 
prepared canister attached to the mask. After 
the beastly mouthpiece was inserted, the hel-
met had to be readjusted on the head. I forgot 
to jerk mine off; the chin strap got entangled 
with the straps of my gas mask. Fortunately, 
Lieutenant Wyndam was standing beside me 
and saw my predicament. He came to my 
aid, but not before I had inhaled some of the 
abominable gas...77 
Difficulty in adjusting the SBRs could result in 
death, so constant practice was needed by both 
new reinforcements and old hands. 
With the introduction of the SBR the soldier 
gained a much greater degree of physical safety 
on the battlefield. SBRs gave longer protection 
against gas — the filters lasted for approxi-
mately forty hours of wearing before they had 
to be replaced — but officers continued to fear 
diat die extended use of gas shells would wear 
out the respirators.78 In contrast to previous 
gas helmets, however, soldiers did not have to 
deal with die near suffocation-like experience, 
but no one ever got over wearing the respirators. 
The foreign nature of breadiing stale air, looking 
out through goggled eyes (which continued to 
cloud up until the end of the war), the strange, 
wheezing intake of air, die sense of isolation 
from one's companions and, most importantly, 
die debilitating heat and exhaustion brought on 
by wearing the mask while engaging in any 
form of activity, were all factors in reducing die 
fighting efficiency of soldiers by an estimated 
one-half.79 Widi die SBR, the oscillating gas 
war tipped back in favour of die defensive. Yet 
while the trench soldier learned to survive in 
his respirator, die gas war did not end there. 
The Gas Environment 
The gas war increased in scope and intensity 
as the war progressed. New delivery systems 
and deadlier gases were introduced to smodier 
the battlefield. On the night of 12/13 July 1917, the 
Germans broke die deadlock in die gas war by 
introducing mustard gas to die already hell's 
broth of other gases polluting the trenches. 
Delivered in shells marked widi a Yellow Cross 
on die head, they were surreptitiously dropped 
into die British lines. After die "all clear" had 
been given to remove gas masks, the soldiers fell 
back into their interrupted slumber. By morning, 
diousands woke up to find diey were blind, 
coughing and covered in suppurating blisters. 
Mus ta rd gas, un l ike the phosgene a n d 
chlorine or the annoying tear gases, was a 
persistent gas that lurked on die battlefield. 
No longer were soldiers able to ant icipate 
gas by canisters or gas shells, as mustard gas 
had a latent potency diat could still be deadly 
to everyone in the vicinity days or weeks 
after it was first de l ivered . Not only d id 
mustard gas pollute trenches and shellholes, 
but it also infected clothing so that w h e n 
soldiers entered dugouts they contaminated 
dieir comrades as well. 
No one was safe from this plague. Although 
me SBR protected soldiers from its effects on die 
lungs and eyes, it remained a powerful tool for 
causing blisters and burns that sent hundreds 
of diousands out of die line by die end of die 
Fig- 5 
"Views Taken at Bexhill 
Command School": 
practising with gas 
masks or respirators on 
(National Archives of 
Canada PA-004897) 




soldier with burns 
caused by mustard gas 
(National Archives of 
Canada C-080027) 
Fig. 7 
Canadians wearing gas 
masks bring in wounded, 
Battle of Amiens, August 
1918. (National Archives 
of Canada PA-
002863) 
war. While many of the effects of mustard gas 
wore off after several weeks (the blisters healed 
and sight returned) and thus did not have the 
lasting effects of its deadly cousins, phosgene 
and chlorine, it was highly disruptive to battle 
plans, and of course also deadly without the 
SBR. More importantly, because mustard gas 
could be found or sent anywhere, it required 
soldiers to wear their SBRs more often and for 
longer durations. Aware of the debilitating 
effects of wearing gas masks continuously, all 
armies soon made gas an integral component of 
all their operations: gas in all forms accounted 
for between 20 and 40 percent of all shells used 
by 1918.80 As the attack gas doctrines were 
continually refined, chemical agents were used 
to harass soldiers, cause a steady stream of 
direct casualties, disrupt the lines of commu-
nication, slow logistics, interrupt enemy 
artillery fire, contaminate forming-up points 
and front-line trenches, and create general 
friction and stress during battles. 
The British went through seven variations 
and produced a total of fifty-five million gas 
masks throughout the war.81 Without them, the 
British and Canadian Tommies would have 
been left to the merciless nature of poison gas, 
and undoubtedly would have lost the war. The 
gas mask blunted the possible war-winning 
nature of poison gas, but it did not negate all of 
its effects. The evolution of the gas helmet is an 
aspect of the war ignored in modern 
historiography and as a result it has been 
wrongly assumed that, once the first gas masks 
were introduced, the threat of gas was reduced 
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to little more than a nuisance. Such views have 
for too long clouded the true nature of fighting 
on the Western Front. It was a slow, difficult pro-
cess by which the frontsoldaten received the gas 
masks, the first being little more than cloths 
dipped in dubious chemical solutions, the rest, 
to varying degrees, leaving soldiers feeling sti-
fled, uncomfortable and effectively blinded. 
Although the SBR gave much better protection 
against lung gases, it still left the soldier with 
reduced.vision, aggravated fatigue and reduced 
fighting efficiency. Finally, no mask prevented 
the deluge of non-lung mustard gas casualties 
that threatened to reduce whole divisions 
during the last year and a half of the war. 
1. See Bill Rawlings, Surviving Trench Warfare 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), for the 
best analysis of this struggle. 
2. See Hubert C. Johnson, Break-Through: Tactics, 
Technology, and the Search for Victory on the West-
em Front in World War I (California: Presidio, 
1994), for a good discussion of this see-saw struggle. 
3. Rudolph Hanslian, "Gas Warfare: A German Apolo-
gia, " Canadian Defence Quarterly 6, no. 1 (October 
1928): 96-99; William Moore, Gas Attack (London: 
Leo Cooper, 1987), 2; Martin van Creveld, Tech-
nology and War (London: The Free Press, 1989), 61. 
4. Not all saw this as an inhumane method of warfare 
and the American representative, the famous Admi-
ral Alfred T. Mahan, asked what die difference was 
between gassing a man and using a torpedo to 
blow up a ship without warning and send him 
to a watery grave. Samuel Hynes, A War Imagined 
(London: Pimlico, 1990), 43-4; Charles H. Foulkes, 
Gas: The Story of the Special Brigade (London: 
William B. Blackwood & Sons, 1936), 19; Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 
vol. I, The Bise of CB Weapons (Stockholm: 
Almquist & Wiksell, 1971), 231-250. 
5. By 1913, Germany produced eighty-five percent of 
the world's chemicals. Jacques J. Bailliu, Canada 
and Chemical Warfare (RMC: Unpublished Master 
of War Studies Thesis, 1989), 11-21; Robert B. 
Asprey, The German High Command at War 
(New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 
1991), 218 
6. Ian Hogg, Gas (New York: Ballandean Books, 1975), 
20. 
7. See Ulrich Trumpener, "The Road to Ypres," Journal 
of Modern History 51 (June 1979), for an excellent 
analysis of the German production of war gases up 
until Ypres. 
8. Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany 
and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 
1997), 170. 
9. Sir Basil Liddell Hart, A History of the World War 
1914-1918 (London: Little, Brown & Company, 
As the soldier struggled in the ever-increasing 
gas environment of the Western Front, the gas 
mask did not become just another component 
of trench stores, it became the most important 
piece of equipment owned by a soldier. As an 
anti-gas lecture read to all men starkly noted, 
"Your life will often depend upon your 
respirator."82 Notwithstanding such warnings, 
the Canadian Corps suffered at least 11 572 
non-fatal battle gas casualties throughout the 
war and its soldiers were burdened with countless 
psychological and physical pressures.83 Despite 
these losses though, without the development 
of an effective gas mask there would have been 
no hope of survival on the Western Front. 
1935), 245-249; Hugh Maclntyre Urquhart, Arthur 
Currie: The Biography of a Great Canadian 
(Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1950), 60. 
10. Daniel Dancocks, Welcome To Flanders Fields 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 148. 
11. At least three men were killed and fifty injured. 
Ludwig Fritz Haber, The Poisonous Cloud (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), 31; Trumpener, "Road to 
Ypres," 472. 
12. There is often discussion with regards to the 
battle as to the fact that the Germans could have 
broken dirough to the Channel ports on the Belgian 
coast. Most importantly, the gas attack was an 
experiment and used to cover the movement of 
several German divisions to the Eastern Front 
where they were to be involved in an upcoming 
offensive. The German infantry were given 
limited objectives and they stuck to them. 
13. Lyn Macdonald, 1915: The Death of Innocence 
(London: Headline Book Publishing, 1993), 192. 
14. John Swettenham, McNaughton Volume I (Toronto: 
The Ryerson Press, 1968), 44-45. 
15. NAC.RG 41, Transcripts from the CBC Radio Pro-
gram "In Flanders Fields," volume 7,3rd Battalion, 
N. Seaman, Tape 2 / Page 12. 
16. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: 
Pimlico, 1976), 71. 
17. J. E. B. Seely, Adventure (London: William 
Heinemann, 1930), 220; Simon Jones, "Under A 
Green Sea: The British Responses To Gas Warfare, 
Part 1 & 2," The Great War, vol. 1, no. 4 (August 
1989): 128. 
18. Robert Asprey wrote that "The rape of Belgium, the 
execution of Edith Cavell [the British nurse exe-
cuted by the Germans for having helped British 
soldiers to escape from Belgium], and the intro-
duction of poison gas were all used by Britain in 
propagandist exercises to invoke the wrath of their 
people as well as attempt to stir the dormant and 
isolated United States into action." Asprey, German 
High Command, 214-5; SIPRI, Chemical and 
Biological Warfare, 231-250, for the use of the Ger-
man gas attack in Allied propaganda. 
NOTES 
Material History Beview 47 (Spring 1998) I Bevue d'histoire de la culture matérielle 47 (printemps 1998) 
18 
